Anthony Giddens: Chapters 8-10

Gidden's last three chapters each offer a different perspective on the transformation of intimacy. Chapter 8, "Contradictions of the Pure Relationship," examines the concept of the pure relationship that he defined earlier in the book as "a situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it" (58). In this chapter, he almost goes so far as to use the lesbian relationship (as evaluated by responses from the Hite study in the 1970s) as the ideal, because, as Giddens says, these women’s sexuality “no longer contains the detritus of external compulsions, but instead takes its place as one among other forms of self-exploration and moral construction” (144). Although Giddens’ generalization of lesbian relationships (and his assumption that no “heterosexual element” [34]—which he does not define, but what I presume to be social pressures?—is present) is problematic, his advocacy for a relationship motivated by self-reflexivity, self-exploration, and moral construction is an intriguing addition to the third wave discourses that we have been studying. He justifies this relationship model with both social and psychological research, acknowledging both the historical construction and the personal/interpersonal dynamic of intimacy.

Chapter 9, “Sexuality, Repression, Civilisation,” outlines the theories of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. Both Reich and Marcuse suggest that society is full of problematic repressions, and that we must move backward in to a non-repressive state in order to move forward. Conversely, Foucault argues that society is obsessed with sex. After examining both viewpoints, Giddens calls for something in between. He asserts that sexual repression is present in our society, and that it stems from the social sequestration of sexuality and unequal gender power. In order to have a psychic and social change occur on these levels, social sequestration would need to be replaced with plurality and gender power with equality. In such a transformation, plastic sexuality does not imply a moral-less permissiveness, but rather a pluralism with an ongoing conversation about sexual ethics. Giddens argues for this approach because he sees it as feasible, as something that would work from the ground up.

Chapter 10, “Intimacy as Democracy,” re-enters the personal and demands that it hold the principles of democracy. He outlines David Held’s four requirements for political democracy—the creation of circumstances in which people can develop and express diverse qualities, protection from coercive power, involvement of individuals in deciding the conditions of their association, and expansion of economic opportunity to develop available resources—and applies them to intimate relationships. Although he uses the heterosexual couple as an example, Giddens argues that these principles can be applied to all relationships: “The democratization of personal life, as a potential, extends in a fundamental way to friendship relations and, crucially, to the relations of parents, children and other kin” (182). There are specific conditions that apply to intimate democracy just as they apply to public sphere democracy—discussion/negotiation/mediation must be ongoing, public accountability must be present, rights come with obligations. In describing these conditions, Giddens offers concrete actions, or “mechanisms,” as he calls them. He demands self-reflexivity for individuals to examine their own conduct and its implicit justifications (193), and even talks about the possibilities of democracy in the sex act. He says that “difference can become a means of communication” (196), and that beginning with equality and democracy on an intimate level may promote these ideas on a global level.

Giddens’ argument comes full circle in his last paragraph. He explains that our sexually addicted society is one where “death has become stripped of meaning” (203) through various social occurrences in the last few centuries, and that a solution to this societal problem is a “life politics” which “implies a renewal of spirituality” (203). I think this puts our discussion about sexual addictions in an interesting light—after his expansion on democratic intimacy in chapter 10, we can see it as a larger part of his argument about democratization.

Some questions…How feasible are Giddens’ proposals for democratic intimacy? Do you agree/disagree with his concrete proposals (see pages 192-193)? Would they work in your intimate relationships, sexual and non-sexual? How do you think Giddens’ concrete proposals would apply for people who are not consumers of a therapy/self-help culture, i.e. people who were less open to these ideas in the first place? Are there some race/class/social location assumptions inherent in Giddens’ arguments that might not make his model of intimacy applicable to a global society (195)?